Birds arrive sequentially at their breeding ground where the nest sites vary in value (measured by reproductive success). Each bird may choose a vacant site or challenge an occupier for its site. In the latter case the occupier is presumed to be the more-likely winner; the loser incurs a cost and must go to a vacant site. In a previous paper (Broom et al, 1997a) we considered the optimal strategy. However, that optimal strategy was complex and perhaps could not be realised in real bird populations, making possibly costly demands both perceptually and at the coding level. With this in mind we introduce certain restricted classes of strategy, and consider how populations might evolve. Computer simulations of various populations have been performed to model the competition amongst several strategies in the presence of recurrent mutations. Certain combinations of strategies persisted and corresponded approximately to the ESS's found in Broom et al (1997a).
Introduction

Game theory
Game theory has featured strongly in modelling the natural world, particularly in the area of animal con icts. It has provided explanations for apparently paradoxical situations, for example the practice of heavily armed animals engaging only in ritualistic contests (Maynard Smith, 1982) and the tendency of (especially male) animals to develop extremely costly signals to acquire mates (Grafen, 1990a; Grafen, 1990b) . The concept of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), introduced in Maynard Smith & Price (1973) has been especially useful, and has been central to a large body of literature; some important examples being Bishop & Cannings (1976) , Cressman (1992) , Haigh (1975) , Hofbauer & Sigmund (1988) , Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998 ), Maynard Smith (1982 . Most of this work has concentrated on games between only two players. This is understandable for two reasons. (i) Many natural con icts involve only two players and thus the theory of pairwise games is widely applicable.
(ii) The mathematics involved in pairwise games is simpler than that for multiplayer games, and thus it is easier to obtain results both in theory and in practical application.
Game theory has its roots in economics originating with Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) , (also see Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981 and Binmore, 1992) and multi-player games have always been central to its theory. See Luce & Rai a (1957) for a general discussion (including a description of its application to voting schemes). However, there has so far been little work in the area of multiplayer game theory applied to biological situations (examples include Broom et al (1997b) , Cannings & Whittaker (1994) and Haigh & Cannings (1989) ). But there are many biological situations which cannot be modelled by pairwise games. This is either because more than two individuals compete simultaneously or alternatively pairwise games occur within a structure which e ectively makes them multi-player, e.g. dominance hierarchies in social animals (Barnard & Burk, 1979) or, as in the current paper, birds nesting at a colonial breeding site (Broom et al, 1996 and Broom et al, 1997a) . Even in classical examples such as the competition of males for mates, the pairwise contests involved are likely to be dependent. Thus it is important to consider multi-player models (both theoretically and practically) to extend the already impressive contribution of game theory to the study of biology.
A sequential-arrivals model of territory acquisition
In many species birds nest together in very large areas with many hundreds or even thousands of sites. An example is kittiwakes along the ledges of a cli . At the beginning of the nesting season, birds (or more properly breeding pairs of birds) have to nd a nest site. The potential sites will be of varying value, (as measured by the expected number of surviving o spring), depending upon various factors such as access by predators, amount of shelter etc. In the model of Broom et al (1997a) the birds are supposed to arrive at their breeding ground one at a time, their position in the sequence of arrivals is randomly determined and they cannot in uence this position, e.g. by postponing their actions at the breeding ground. For a consideration of this problem where birds can a ect their arrival time, see Kokko (1999) . On arrival a bird may either occupy a vacant site or challenge for one which is already occupied. A loser in a ght resulting from such a challenge must move to an unoccupied site and at the same time incurs a cost. From the species point of view, the best strategy is just to ll up the sites in an orderly fashion without any con ict, since this maximises the total payo to the group. However, selection operates at the individual level, and thus behaviour which is bene cial to the individual (even at the expense of its group-mates) will become prevalent in the population. Thus the behaviour which evolves should be approximately the same as that which would occur if the birds were thinking rationally and sel shly about their options.
In Broom et al (1997a) we considered what was the`optimal behaviour' for a population of birds in the sense that each individual adopted what was optimal for them given the situation they faced, and assuming that all subsequent arrivals would also behave optimally. It was assumed in that paper that the occupier of a site was the more likely winner of a contest. A recursive argument was employed to derive both general results regarding this optimal behaviour and also to solve certain particular cases (i.e. values of the costs, rewards, and probability) to illustrate some of the features of those solutions. It was shown that for a reasonable set of nest sites (e.g. linear payo s) the birds which arrive rst tend to do better than those which arrive later. Initially the birds do well to occupy empty sites until the quality of these become too poor, after which they risk contesting the better sites. An interesting and important result is the existence of a threshold value. Birds which arrive before a certain time do not challenge and birds which arrive after it do. The very last birds contest the top sites, previous ones challenge on sites further from the best. There can be a`second wave' or`third wave' etc. of challenges when birds further from the end will start to contest the top sites. The model describes an interesting pattern of behaviour of the population as a whole.
We assume that the information used to choose a nesting strategy is coded for genetically. There is evidence that this is true for related behaviour in the type of migratory birds that we are considering, especially the direction of migration (e.g. Berthold et al; 1992) . Thus we do not envisage a bird making complex decisions, but simply responding to preprogrammed cues telling it how to behave. Successful strategies, however, will resemble those which would be chosen by a rational individual. The solution found in Broom et al (1997a) was a unique optimal strategy for every bird in every situation but it required a precise knowledge of the values of all the sites. The solution is extremely complex, requiring a very large look-up table exactly specifying what to do in each possible situation for each possible set of site values. Thus the genetic system may not be capable of coding for this. Also the site values will vary from year to year (as will the number of sites), so that the`best' strategy one year may not be the best one in subsequent years. In any case, this may be an expensive process; simpler information storage requires less brain capacity, and so the cost of simpler storage systems to the bird is likely to be less than more complex ones.
We see that there are several reasons to think that birds will be programmed with a strategy which resembles how a rational player would behave, but without the level of complexity of Broom et al (1997a) . It should be noted, however, some species are capable of making complex decisions, rather than simply being genetically preprogrammed, see Clayton & Dickinson (1999) for an example. Thus they may be able to evaluate a good strategy conditional upon their environment, which, if not up to the complexity level of Broom et al (1997a) , may be more complex than the type of strategy that we envisage in this paper.
We consider here certain restricted classes of strategies which might be reasonable for a population of birds, and nd the best strategies within each class. The type of strategies chosen are those that resemble the optimal strategy in certain key features, whilst keeping the amount of information stored to a minimum. There are a number of sites of decreasing value, and a bird may either challenge upon an occupied site or occupy a vacant site. If there are good sites still available it does not make sense to challenge for a slightly better site and risk receiving an injury, so a bird should just occupy one of the free sites. However if the remaining sites are poor compared to some occupied ones then it will be worth the risk to ght and try to obtain a good site.
We consider three types of strategy, called Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3. In Type 1, the birds pick the best free site until a critical number have been occupied, after which they challenge for one of the top sites, each with equal probability. Thus the`threshold' result is maintained. Recall that this result depends upon the assumption that the occupier of a site is more likely to win a contest than the challenger. This assumption will apply throughout this paper without further comment. We show that there is no pure ESS within this class. Type 2 is an extension of this idea; the probability that a bird challenges for a given site is now not constant over the top sites. There is also no pure ESS within this second class. However there is a pure strategy, the pivotal strategy, which resists opponents with a single mutation (in a sense to be de ned later). Each strategy of Type 2 is equivalent to a combination of strategies of Type 1. It is observed that for the pivotal strategy, the early occupiers of the top sites do worse than the occupiers of some lower sites, thus a further re nement is introduced (Type 3 strategies) where early birds do not occupy the top sites. The properties of this third type of strategy are investigated. An advantage of this type of strategy to that of Broom et al (1997a) is that it is robust to environmental changes. Thus in a uctuating environment where optimality decisions are di cult, a relatively simple strategy such as this might be best. For a general treatment of optimality decisions in uctuating environments, see McNamara et al (1995) .
Section 2 describes the sequential-arrivals model and the simple strategies that we consider. In Section 3 the existence of the pivotal strategy in the limiting case when the number of sites is in nite is proved, and the form of the pivotal strategy is found for the case where the intrinsic values of the sites are linearly dependent upon the site number. In Section 4 we describe computer simulations of populations playing strategies restricted to the chosen types and examine how the populations behave. Section 5 is a discussion of our results.
2 A sequential-arrivals model
The model
Suppose that a set of n birds B 1 ; :::; B n arrive sequentially at n nest sites S 1 ; :::; S n . The value of the site S i is V i ( 0) for the bird occupying that site at the end of the process, i.e. when all birds are settled on a site, where V i V j if i < j. If there are more sites than birds we can ignore the worst sites, if there are more birds than sites we can create phantom sites with zero value.
When a bird arrives it may choose to go to any vacant site or to challenge the occupier of any occupied site. A challenge is a contest of the following form:
The challenger wins with probability p 0:5, otherwise the occupier wins. The winner becomes the occupier of the contested site, the loser pays a cost C, (receives a payo of ?C < 0 ) and must retreat to an unoccupied site of its choice.
Thus a bird may not make any challenge after its initial one, and must remain at the site it has occupied (although it may be removed by the challenges of other birds). If the bird was allowed to challenge again then it would be in the same position as the previous new arrival had been, and would thus make the same decision, resulting in an in nite number of challenges (and costs) for each bird, so that it would not be sensible for any bird to challenge. When a bird loses a contest in this model it receives an injury, which may prevent it from making any more challenges. It is possible to make this model more complicated (e.g. variable values of p and C depending upon which site the contest takes place, more than one challenge per bird) however the present model seems to have the most important feature (choose a free site or ght) and is amenable to analysis.
The contest nishes after the arrival of the nal bird. The payo to a bird is the value of the site it occupies at the end of the contest minus any penalties it has received for losing challenges.
In this paper a variety of parameters are used in a number of contexts. Table  1 gives a list of all the parameters used, together with their meaning. 
Simple Strategies
In Broom et al (1997a) the birds played rationally conditional upon the positions of all the birds which had arrived before them and upon the assumption that all subsequent birds would also behave rationally. As indicated in the Introduction, the strategies which result are very complicated and here we consider three, relatively simple, types of strategy.
Type 1 divides sites into three categories; good sites (1; :::; I), medium sites (I + 1; :::; J) and poor sites (J + 1; :::; n). A bird will occupy the best free site if a good or medium site is available. However, if only poor sites are free it will challenge for a good site chosen at random with each site having an equal probability of being chosen (if it just chose the best site then it would probably be challenged several times by other birds also playing this strategy, and so may well lose the site). If the bird loses a contest, whether as challenger or challenged, it occupies the best free site. Thus a strategy is described by an integer pair (I; J).
Type 2 is a re nement upon Type 1. In Type 1 all the players challenge the top sites with an equal probability. However it may be more sensible to allocate a higher probability to the best of these sites (or vice versa!), so we introduce a probability vector p so that p i is the probability that a bird will challenge upon site i (1 i I). A strategy is de ned by a vector and a pair of integers (p; I; J). Note that given the values of the (p i ), I is determined; it is simply the largest i for which p i > 0.
Type 3 is a di erent re nement of Type 1. For late birds, the only free sites are the poor ones and so they challenge for the top sites. Thus the early occupiers of these very good sites face the prospect of being evicted from these sites, having to go to a poor site and receiving an injury in the process. A Type 3 strategy attempts to take this e ect into account by allowing the early birds to ignore the best I sites. Later birds occupy or challenge a site from the top I.
More formally the three types of strategy are de ned as follows: Type 1: If S i is free for some i J then go to the best free site, otherwise challenge upon S k (1 k I) with probability 1=I. If a contest is lost, go to the best free site. A strategy is de ned by the pair (I; J). Type 2: If S i is free for some i J then go to the best free site, otherwise challenge upon S k (1 k I) with probability p k . If a contest is lost, go to the best free site. Setting p = (p i ) (i = 1; :::; I) a strategy is de ned by (p;I; J). Type 3: If S i is free, for some i 2 I +1; J], go to the best free site within I +1; J], otherwise go to S k (1 k I) with probability 1=I. If S k is occupied then of course a challenge occurs. If a contest is lost, go to the best free site. Strategies of this type are de ned by the pair (I; J).
Asymptotic results
As has been remarked in the Introduction, many species of birds nest together in very large groups of hundreds or even thousands of sites and so it is of interest to consider the behaviour of populations where n is large. We investigate the properties of strategy types (1) and (2) as n tends to in nity. Let X = (n ? I)=n; Y = (n ? J)=n and in general x = (n ? i)=n, so that in the limit of large n the sites have indices which are continuous over (0, 1] . De ne U x as the reward for occupying site S x at the end of the contest. We shall assume that U x is a continuous and monotone increasing function on (0,1] (x is decreasing with site number and so increasing with site value).
De ne f(x) (X x < 1) by the requirement that f(x)dx is the probability that a (challenging) bird challenges on a site in the interval x to x+dx. Strategies are thus of the form (f; X; Y ). As well as modelling large populations, the asymptotic results given below give an indication of how populations with smaller numbers of birds and sites may behave (see Section 4.2 for a comparison when the number of sites is ten).
Asymptotic results for general payo s
It is clear that no pure strategy can form an ESS within the class de ned by Type 1 (or that formed by Type 3), except in the situation where the cost of losing a contest is high so that it is best for nobody to challenge and X = 1; Y = 0 is an ESS. Suppose there were such an ESS (X; Y ) X < 1; Y > 0 for Type 1. If almost all players play this strategy, then each arrival after (Y; 1] are lled is equally likely to challenge upon any site S x ; x 2 (X; 1], and since U x > U y when x > y, there is a greater expected payo associated with challenging upon S x than S y for any particular bird. This means that a bird which chooses a strategy (X ; Y ) where X > X, will have a greater payo than the original strategy (at least when the number of players of strategy (X ; Y ) is small), and so can invade. The argument is the same for Type 3. Note that mixed ESS's (comprising players of di erent strategies) are not excluded by this argument.
This argument does not hold for the nite site case in one special case: namely when there is only a single site which should be challenged upon, so that the rational strategy de ned in Broom et al (1997a) can be expressed as a Type 1 strategy and so is an ESS of that class. For example when n = 6; V 1 = 60; V 2 = 4; V 3 = 3; V 4 = 2; V 5 = 1; V 6 = 0; C = 0; p = 0:4. In this case the rst bird should go to S 1 , and every other bird should challenge on S 1 , the loser going to the best free site. Thus I = J = 1 is an ESS (there are no 'medium' sites).
We now consider strategies of Type 2, and proceed to nd a strategy which is resistant to invasion, although it is not an ESS. In the process we show that there is no pure ESS of Type 2. To do this we need some de nitions.
We suppose that, as in the nite case, birds arrive in a strict order so that B r arrives before B s if and only if r < s. Thus when B r arrives, the set of previous arrivals is fB s : s < rg. We shall de ne time t as the time of the arrival of B t .
Note that our temporal scale need not be a linear function of real time, but is a strictly increasing function of it. Times t = 0 and t = 1 will correspond to the arrival of the rst and last birds, respectively.
We de ne W x;t to be the expected payo to an occupier of site x at time t, i.e. birds have arrived up to and including B t , and the occupied sites are S w ; w 2 1 ? t; 1].
Further we de ne the expected future payo (z) to a bird arriving at time 1 ? z as the mean payo received by such a bird. For a bird which arrives at time t, the best free site is S 1?t . If a bird does not challenge, its expected future payo is the expected payo to a bird occupying that site i.e. (z) = W z;1?z . If it challenges on the site with value U r , then the expected future payo is (z) = pW r;1?z + (1 ? p)(W z;1?z ? C).
If all of the population play (f; X; Y ) then W x;t = U x (x < X; for all t) and W x;1 = U x for all x:
Theorem 1
There is a unique strategy (f; X; Y ) which cannot be invaded by any strategy which is a single mutation away (i.e. it di ers in Y or f=X only). This strategy is not an ESS and will be called the pivotal strategy.
Theorem 1 is proved in the Appendix.
Since the pivotal strategy is the only pure strategy which can resist invasion by a strategy a single mutation away, it is the only candidate ESS. Since it is in fact not an ESS, we conclude there is no pure strategy ESS for Type 2.
Following the argument in the proof of Theorem 1, the pivotal strategy can be invaded by a small group of a su ciently similar strategy. The advantage of this new strategy is lost if too many players adopt it. This leads us to conjecture that there is a stable collection of strategies centred around the pivotal strategy which form a mixed ESS. Evidence in support of this claim is found in the simulations of the next section.
Note that a strategy of Type 2 is a combination of strategies of Type 1. If we have an in nite combination of strategies all with the same Y but with varying X we can construct any decreasing density function (a pivotal strategy clearly has a decreasing f(x) due to condition (6) in the proof of Theorem 1).
Asymptotic results for linear payo s
We will now consider a special case where there is a linear relationship between the number of the site and its value. This seems a plausible scenario, for instance if sites are along a cli edge where the worst sites are those inland closest to terrestrial predators. This case was also considered in Broom et al (1997a) . We nd an expression for the pivotal function.
We de ne the function h(x) by
Theorem 2
When p > C=(C + 1) and U x = x, the strategy de ned by Theorem 1 satis es the following equations: In this section we consider populations of strategies either from Type 1 or Type 3. In each case V i = n ? i + 1. There were two di erent types of simulations; (a) a single large area with many (1000) sites, (b) many small areas, each with a few sites (1000 areas of 10 sites each).
A discussion of simulation (a)
C was chosen to be either 100 or 150, p to be 0.3 and each bird starts with a base capital (reserves) of 100. Initially the population is made up of 100 players of each of ten di erent strategies (chosen randomly). These players are then ordered randomly and arrive at the area in that order, playing their strategy, until all players have arrived. The payo s for the sites occupied and the costs accrued (making a negative contribution) are then added together for all the birds playing a given strategy, to give a total payo for each strategy. The number of birds playing a strategy in the next round is proportional to that strategy's total payo from the previous round (to the nearest whole number, and so that the total stays close to 1000). The process is repeated for successive rounds. If the mean payo of birds playing a particular strategy is greater than the mean payo of the population as a whole then the numbers playing that strategy will increase. If any of these payo s becomes negative (or less than 0:5) then that strategy is eliminated and a new strategy is introduced at random with ten players; the overall number is adjusted to make the total 1000.
(i) To choose a random strategy of Type 1 or Type 3, we need to obtain a pair of integers I and J between 1 and 1000 inclusive, with I < J. To do this, two uniform random variables were chosen from (0; 1), multiplied by 1000, the integer part taken and increased by 1, then the larger of these was J and the smaller I. The possible number of strategies in this case is very large, of the order of 10 6 . A new strategy appeared roughly once in every two generations, so that many generations are required to be reasonably certain that a particular strategy has entered the population at some point in time. It is, of course, not guaranteed that it will remain in the population even if it has occurred, because the level of introduction is low and its representatives may be assigned unfavourable positions in the queue. Hence the population is unlikely to settle down quickly and indeed it was found that the mixture in the population continually changed.
(ii) To reduce the number of strategies, I and J were restricted so that they could only take values which were multiples of 100. This is perhaps more realistic than the previous example. Real birds would not count exactly how many other birds had arrived or know the exact quality of each site, but might be able to distinguish large di erences. In some cases this led to more obviously stable behaviour than in (i), with some strategies persisting for long periods of time. Figure 1 .1 shows the evolution of a population with p = 0:3; C = 100 and strategies of Type 1. The proportions of the population playing the most dominant strategies is shown; the plotted points being`running means of 1000' (i.e. the mean proportion from the last 1000 generations). A total of 100000 gener-ations are considered. There are four strategies which together make up most of the population. Generally two or three of them are present in the population in large numbers at any particular time. At any time the most common strategy is usually (200,600), but sometimes (200,700), and one or both of (100,700) and (300,600) is also present. For clarity, the gure only shows three of these strategies ((200,700) is excluded). Figure 1 .2 shows the same plot as Fig. 1.1 , except that C = 150. There are again four common strategies with (200,700) easily the most common, often making up 70% of the population. Generally there is one other strategy which co-exists with this, namely one of (100,700), (100,800) or (300,700). The strategy (100,800) is omitted from the plot, again for clarity.
In both cases, although the actual mixture in the population changes the basic features remain the same. There is a mixture of values of I 100, 200 and 300, which resembles the pivotal strategy from the previous section. The value of J is less variable, sometimes almost all players have J = 700 in Fig. 1 .2, but sometimes there is another value of J also present. The only type of strategy that can invade the pivotal strategy is one where J is larger and I smaller, or vice versa. This is precisely the type of strategies which occur in Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 (larger I tend to be associated with smaller J). Thus these gures provide evidence to support the hypothesis of a co-existing band of strategies close to the pivotal strategy. Figure 1 .3 shows the same plot as Fig. 1 .1, except that the strategies are of Type 3 instead of Type 1. Now there is one common strategy (300,500) which occurs with a wide range of other strategies. The mixture is very variable, with (300,500) making up just under half the population, but no other strategies making a large contribution. The most signi cant other strategies are (200,500) and (200,600). When C is increased to 150 there is no persistent dominating strategy or mixture of strategies. The most common overall strategy is (200,500), which can dominate the population for a while, but then it is eliminated only to return and dominate the population again.
The existence of relatively stable strategy mixtures in Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 for Type 1 strategies is in contrast to Type 3 strategies ( Fig. 1.3) . Individuals start lling up the sites from I, so avoiding challenges with players of the same strategy.
Thus there is con ict between strategies with di erent values of I and there are no longer stable mixtures. In each case there appears to be a clearly best strategy; however if its numbers are reduced due to chance (since the population is small) it loses its advantage and can be removed from the population completely; this is especially true in the case when C=150. Thus in this case the dominant strategies do not resemble the pivotal strategy. Strategies were chosen in a similar way to (a). One thousand di erent areas of ten birds were simulated and the total payo s won by each strategy were collected together from all of the sites. The proportion of the total payo won by each strategy again becomes the proportion of players of that strategy for the next generation. If any total payo for a strategy is negative, then a new strategy is chosen randomly and introduced with 100 birds (a proportion 0.01 of the population) the numbers for the other strategies being adjusted to make 10000 birds in total). Figure 2 .1 shows the evolution of a population with p = 0:3; C = 1 and strategies of Type 1. The proportion of the population playing the most dominant strategies is shown; the plotted points again being`running means of 1000' (i.e. the mean proportion from the last 1000 generations). A total of 100000 generations are considered. Generally, there are three co-existing strategies: (2,6) (the most common), (1,7) and (3,6). However, the population may lose either (1,7) or (3,6) temporarily.
In Figure 2 .2 C is now 1:5. For almost all of the time, there is a mixture of two strategies: (2,7) (easily the most common) and one of (1,7) and (1,8). As for Figs. 1.1 and 1.2, Figs. 2.1 and 2 .2 show a stable strategy mixture which resembles the pivotal strategy. The mixture is less variable, probably due to the increased population size (10000 rather than 1000). Figure 2 .3 shows the same plot as Fig. 2.2 , except that the strategies are of Type 3 not Type 1. The strategies (2,5) and (2,6) dominate the population. The frequencies are virtually equal, with no other strategy featuring to any signi cant extent. If C is increased to 1:5, the strategy (2,5) completely dominates the population, always accounting for over 90% of the population. Fig. 2.3 there is a mixture of two strategies with the same I but di erent J. This mixture is again stable, and it is presumed that the true`best' value of J lies between 5 and 6, thus allowing the strategies from either side to dominate the population.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
A comparison with optimal play
In this paper we have considered simple strategies which had some features in common with the optimal play from Broom et al (1997a) . However, do the best strategies from this restricted class resemble the optimal strategy numerically?
When the number of sites is 1000 C = 100, and p = 0:3, as in Fig. 1.1 , the optimal value of J lies between 600 and 700. Thus the mean overall payo is 500:5 ? 100 multiplied by the proportion of challenges, so is approximately 500:5 ? 100 350=1000 465 The maximum value of I occurring regularly (and so the lowest site commonly challenged upon) was 300. Finding the optimal strategy with these parameters, the rst bird to challenge is B 588 , so that the number of challenges is 413, and so the mean expected payo is 459.2. The lowest site challenged upon is S 364 . Thus there is a rough correspondence between our simpli ed case and the optimal one. The main di erence appears to be that individuals are not challenging enough in the simpli ed case, and could thus be exploited by more aggressive players with more complex strategies. Figure 2 .1 shows that when the number of sites is ten, C = 1 and p = 0:3 then the most common value of J is 6. Thus the mean overall payo is 5:5?0:4 = 5:1. The maximum value of I which commonly occurs is 3. For the optimal strategy, the rst bird to challenge is B 7 , thus there are four challenges and the mean payo is 5.1. The lowest site to be challenged upon is S 3 . Thus there is a strong resemblance between the two strategies.
5 Discussion Severinghaus (1996) studied the behaviour of Brown Shrike Lanius cristatus arriving at a breeding ground. The locations of the territories of early arrivals tended to be scattered throughout the study area, and later birds lled the gaps between them. The sizes of territories varied greatly amongst birds; although early occupied territories were not generally larger, they may have been in preferred locations. Initially there was little aggression between birds, but as the breeding ground lled up this aggression increased and some territory owners had to defend their territories several times. This agrees with our general predictions of the rst birds occupying good sites, and later birds challenging for a site only when only poor sites remain free, and in particular closely approximates the threshold phenomenon found in Broom et al (1997a) . It was also noticed that prior residence granted the defender an advantage in any contest, again as in our model. Note that the behaviour of birds in this case was complicated by a large number of 'transient' birds who stopped at the site only brie y, before continuing on to other sites. This introduced 'wait and see' strategies, where a bird would choose an inferior site temporarily, and wait for a transient bird on a superior site to leave, and then occupy the newly vacant site.
In Broom et al (1997a) we found the optimal site-choice strategy for a group of birds arriving sequentially at a nesting area. This turned out to be complicated, but did possess some important features which were simple, for instance the threshold phenomenon. It is unreasonable to assume that real birds will be able to evaluate very complicated (and parameter-sensitive) strategies, and so in this paper we have introduced strategies which possess the important features of Broom et al (1997a) without their complexity.
When birds which do not challenge always occupy the best free site, simulations (Figs 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2. 2) show a population uctuating around an equilibrium, which we refer to as the pivotal strategy. By comparing the values of the parameters I and J obtained to the theoretical results from Broom et al (1997a) , we notice that the simple strategy is a good approximation to the optimal strategy. If birds are allowed to choose a free site other than the best (particularly the best that birds playing the same strategy would never challenge upon), then the resemblance to the pivotal strategy is no longer in evidence. There is either little structure as for simulations of type a), or there is a highly stable strategy or mixture of strategies as for simulations of type b).
The results of our previous work (Broom et al, 1997a) were rather daunting in that it concluded that the best strategy was extremely complicated. It is quite unreasonable to believe that any organism (including human) could calculate it. But here we see that quite simple rules can produce behaviour which e ectively mimics the best strategy. We suggest that this might be a common feature of evolution: life is complex and situations can change without warning; do not try to solve the full problem, but nd simple robust rules which work well most of the time. Suppose that almost all players in the population play (f; X; Y ). Consider a bird playing this strategy which arrives at time 1 ? z, so that the best free site is site z. The expected payo to it is 1 (z) where
Note that when X < z < 1, the site a bird occupies will be subject to challenges later. However, these only occur when an incoming bird nds the best free site to be of low value, that is when z < Y . Thus no challenges occur before time 1 ? Y and the expected payo to the occupier is not a ected until this time, i.e. The di erence between the payo s is therefore
To prevent the new strategy from invading the population, the above expression must be positive.
Firstly we suppose that f(x) = g(x) for all x, and thus X = X . Here (4) This must be non-negative for arbitrary values of f(x)?g(x), the only restrictions being that the function has an integral of zero and is non-positive for x < X. Thus we require Z Y 0 W x;1?z dz to be constant for X < x < 1 and to take a value less than or equal to that constant for all other values of x. It is clear from considering the value of this function when x = X (see condition (7)) that
Here we have only shown that no invading strategy can have a larger payo than a strategy that ful ls this condition. To prevent invasion, we need to show that an invader does worse when it is played by a non-zero but small proportion of the population.
If a small proportion now play (g; X ; Y ), then the number of challenges upon values of x for which g(x) > f(x) increases and so its expected future payo decreases. But since g(x) > f(x), the occupier of these devalued sites is more likely to be an invader than the proportion of the population that are invaders implies. Similarly the number of challenges upon values of x for which g(x) < f(x) decreases and so its expected future payo increases. Since g(x) > f(x), the occupier of these sites is more likely to be a (f; X; Y ) player than would be expected through choosing a random player. Thus the payo to the (g; X ; Y ) players is less than that of the (f; X; Y ) players, and so they cannot invade the population.
Under the assumption of continuity of f(x), we know that f(X) = 0
(in fact if the assumption of continuity of f(x) was made only for x 2 (X; 1], it is fairly straightforward to prove that this is true). Thus any strategy which satis es (5), (6) and (7) cannot be invaded by another strategy which is a single mutation away.
That for every game de ned by C; p; U x there is exactly one such strategy can be seen from the following argument.
It is clear that for any x > X if f(x) = 0 then W x;1?Y U X and for su ciently large f(x), W x;1?Y < U X . Thus by allowing f(x) to vary, and not imposing the restriction that f(x) integrates to unity, for given values of Y and X there is a unique function f(x) which solves (6) and (7).
For a given Y , there will be exactly one value of X which generates an f(x) with an integral of unity. Clearly when Y ! 0 (nobody challenges) the value of X for which (6) is satis ed approaches one. Further notice that if Y increases and the value of X does not decrease, then since the value of W x;1?y decreases with y, the value of f(x) must decrease. But this is true for all x, so that f(x) would no longer integrate to unity. Thus if Y increases, X must decrease.
Note that this argument breaks down for Y su ciently close to 1, when the corresponding X would be less than Y . However since we know that
i.e. the value of Y which solves (5) must be less than X, so that such cases are of no interest. In fact it can be seen that since the solution to (6) and (7) has the value of X decreasing with Y , and that there is a solution X = 1; Y = 0, there will be a unique solution which also solves (5), and thus a unique pivotal strategy.
The pivotal strategy, however, is not an ESS. Equation (5) implies that every player playing a strategy (g; X ; Y ) performs identically within a population of (f; X; Y ) players. Suppose, however, that a new strategy plays Y = Y + , for small positive . Then, on average, it does not matter what g is chosen for the birds arriving after time 1 ? Y . However those arriving between times 1 ? Y and 1 ? Y will face a situation in which it is better to challenge on a site near X rather than 1 (the value to an occupier of all these sites is on average equal and the sites near 1 get better relative to those near X as we get nearer to the last arrival). Thus a g which is larger than f for x near X in conjunction with Y > Y can invade. Similarly if is negative a g can be chosen which is larger than f when x is near unity, such that (g; X; Y ) can invade.
B Proof of Theorem 2
The intrinsic value of S x is U x = x and the density function of challenges is f(x). To satisfy condition (5) (1 ? p) p C < 1 or p > C 1 + C : If this inequality is not satis ed then the cost of injury is so large that no challenges take place. Let P t (x) be the probability that a bird occupies S x at time t given that it occupies it at time 1 ? Y . Thus P 1?Y (x) = 1 and @ @y P t (x) = ?f(x)pP t (x) ) P t (x) = e ?f(x)p(Y ?1+t) ) P 1 (x) = e ?f(x)pY :
It follows that The rst term is the payo for holding S x multiplied by the probability of doing so, the second term combines all the possible sites which the bird could be displaced to, integrating the product of the payo at S y minus the cost, the probability of still holding S x at time y and the probability density of being successfully challenged at y. Thus As x ! X, h(x) ! 0, so that for condition (6) to hold we require the above expression to be equal to (1?p)(Y=2?C)+pX, the mean payo for a challenger at X (there is probability 0 of being displaced by another bird), thus 1 ? e ?h (x) h ( In addition to the above we require that 
